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Judging the success of the UK Retail Distribution Review: An 
agencement  and performativity perspective 
 
Abstract 
The Retail Distribution Review (RDR) resulted in a series of reforms to the UK retail 
advice sector in 2012.  This is the latest in a series of initiatives addressing what are 
identified as market failures in the UK’s retail advice sector.  This article uses the 
notions of performativity and agencement to elaborate and explain the processes by 
which reforms based on the economic theory of market efficiency have failed to address 
adequately consumer financial advice issues in the UK.  The result has been a range of 
unresolved and unexpected problems.  It is argued that the lack of success of a series of 
regulatory reforms intended to improve access to advice for UK consumers is destined 











The need for an improved advice regime in the UK’s retail financial services sector has 
been increasingly apparent.  In 2008, the UK’s national savings ratio reached its lowest 
in nearly twenty years (ONS, 2010), and it is predicted savings levels will continue to 
be amongst the lowest in the OECD countries (OECD, 2014).  At the same time, poor 
levels of literacy and numeracy, and individuals’ lack of confidence in their own 
financial abilities (Atkinson et al. 206; Clery et al., 2010; House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee, 2009), have underlined the importance of advice and support for    
individuals in making decisions about their financial future. 
 
Yet, there is lack of trust in financial firms (Chartered Insurance Institute, 2010; 
Edelman, 2012).  A range of costly and highly publicised advice scandals, including 
personal pensions, endowment mortgages, ‘precipice’ bonds and, most recently, 
Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) (Dunn, 2009; Goff & Cadman, 2014) illustrate 
problems in the advice sector, including complexity, bias, lack of consumer capability 
and poor quality of advice.  The UK financial regulator has noted that: 
 
Taken together, these features suggest that the market for retail investments 
does not work efficiently – and certainly not as well as it could – serving 
neither the interests of consumers or firms, whether providers or 
distributors of retail financial services. (FSA, 2007:4) 
 
It is no wonder the regulation of retail financial advice in the UK has undergone 
significant examination and reform, most recently as a result of the Retail Distribution 
Review (RDR) (see FSA, 2009a).  The RDR has resulted in a series of reforms 
concerning the provision of financial advice that were implemented fully by the end of 
2012.  As the regulator has stated:  
 
… the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) is one of the core strands of our 
retail market strategy. It complements our aims to improve financial 
capability and further ensures firms deliver fair outcomes for consumers. It 
is essential for promoting a resilient, effective and attractive retail 
investment market. The RDR will modernise the industry, giving more 
consumers confidence and trust in the market at a time when they need 







The various policy strands arising from the RDR, like reforms dating at least as far back 
as depolarisation reforms in 1988, are concerned with improving market efficiency, 
addressing market failures to achieve better outcomes for consumers in the retail advice 
market (Ring, 2004).  They are underpinned by a model of ideal markets, efficiency and 
market failures. The assumption is that addressing market failures will improve overall 
welfare in the (retail advice) market (Dasgupta, 2007; Moore, 2007).  
 
This article therefore takes its starting point from the initial analysis set out in the 
Review itself: 
 
A principal aim of regulation is to deal with market failures. These have 
manifested themselves in various ways in the distribution of retail 
investment products. We are using this review to address these issues with 
a view to improving the working of the market and thereby reduce the need 
for regulation. (FSA, 2007:15) 
 
Recent research has drawn tentative conclusions about the extent to which the reforms 
arising from the RDR will improve access to, as well as the cost of, advice. It has also 
identified potential problems that still require to be overcome (see, for example, Clare, 
2013; The Personal Finance Society, 2014).  More generally, Georgosouli (2007) notes 
the limitations of using an economic rationale to develop policy in relation to investor 
protection, highlighting both the technical and socio-political shortcomings of an 
economic rationale for regulatory reform. 
 
The article therefore provides a critique of current financial regulation in the UK retail 
advice sector.  In particular, it draws attention to one approach for tracing the processes 
and mechanisms through which the outcomes of regulatory reform can be understood.  
In doing so, it argues that the theory of market efficiency underpinning the reforms in 
retail advice can be understood as being performative.  It also argues that this theory is 
an integral element of a collection and framing of statements, behaviours and material 
practices, assembled to ‘perform’ the very circumstances that theory purports to 






Here, Callon’s idea of agencement is useful in re-envisaging the RDR as a ‘framing and 
attribution’ device (Callon, 2005).  By agencement, what is meant is any collection of 
actors, equipment, texts, technical devices or tools which, by their interconnection, give 
rise, and meaning, to action (Muniesa et al., 2007; Mackenzie et al., 2007).  The 
trajectory of the retail advice sector therefore depends upon the actions and outcomes 
arising out of the collection, or assemblage, of day-to-day relationships, procedures, 
processes, economic theory and material devices arranged through the agencement of 
the RDR.  
  
It is important to recognise that this approach rejects the notion of economic theory as 
an attempt to delineate the ‘nature’ of some kind of ‘natural phenomenon’.   Instead, the 
performative function of the theory of efficient markets and market failure arises 
through it both purporting to describe, as well as attempting to constitute (through the 
agencement of which it forms part), the nature of those markets.  In that sense, the 
success of the RDR depends upon the extent to which the theory of efficient markets, 
and its consequences, come to be regarded as encapsulating the ‘truth’ (Callon, 
2006:14).  This article argues that continuing problems in the reform of the retail advice 
sector, provide evidence of what has been referred to as ‘counter-performativity’ 
(Mackenzie, 2006).  In attempting to encapsulate the ‘reality’ of the advice sector 
through an economic assemblage, the actions and outcomes of that assemblage have 
created unintended and unanticipated problems that result in the ‘reality’ becoming less 
like the theory.  The latest concerns over RDR are simply the current manifestation of 
this saga that has played out over decades.   
 
The discussion begins by examining regulatory developments in UK retail advice over 
the past decade.  It then analyses these developments using the notions of agencement 
and performativity, considering the extent to which the economic theory of market 
efficiency can be said to be performative.  Thereafter, consideration is given to the 
problems and issues that have arisen in the course of the RDR and to how these 
represent examples of counterperformativity, the unexpected and unanticipated events 





economic agencement.  It is suggested that, at least in part, this can be attributed to the 
inherent difficulties in adopting an economic approach to the retail advice market.   
 
Retail advice and regulation in the UK 
 
From 1988-2004 consumers in the UK retail advice market sought advice either from a 
‘tied’ adviser or an independent financial adviser (IFA). The former was an agent of one 
particular company providing retail financial products, and could only advise on the 
products of that company. The latter was an agent of the customer and advised on 
products across the market of providers.  This arrangement was referred to as 
‘polarisation’.   
 
The Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT), illustrating the pervasive influence of the 
notion of market efficiency, noted that ‘the polarisation rules restrict or distort 
competition to a significant extent’ (OFT, 1999:10), but were justified in order to 
protect consumers.  This reflected the view that ‘in efficient markets, the preferences of 
the end-consumer will ultimately drive behaviour and market structure’, but that the 
retail financial services market was one of ‘weak consumer influence’ (Sandler 2001:7). 
   
In November 2000 the Financial Services Authority (FSA) sought reform of 
polarisation, arguing consumer weaknesses could be addressed ‘through other methods 
which we expect to be much less restrictive of competition’ (Davies, 2000).  A 
continued emphasis on market efficiency was reflected in the titles of its two key 
Consultation Articles: CP121, ‘Reforming Polarisation: Making the market work for 
consumers’ (FSA, 2002a); and CP166, ‘Reforming Polarisation: removing the barriers 
to choice’ (FSA, 2003).  It was argued customers did not shop around for advice in the 
polarised regime, thereby creating ‘vertical restraint’ in relying on the brand name of a 
provider (through its tied advisers) rather than a relatively unknown IFA. Effectively, 
this gave customers a choice of only one firm’s products (FSA, 2002a:46).  
 
This focus on market efficiency is reflected across the recent history of the UK financial 





work was been to improve consumer outcomes.  In the retail financial advice market, 
the underlying philosophy was been to increase market efficiency by addressing market 
failures.  The very first Occasional Article published by the FSA in 1999 was ‘The 
Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation’ in which seven economic justifications 
for regulation were identified (Llewellyn, 1999).  These were grouped around what are 
generally regarded as the key justifications for efficiency-enhancing interventions in the 
market: information asymmetries; monopolies, or more generally lack of competition; 
and externalities (Backhaus, 2012; Wonderling, 2005).   It is an approach which has 
been continued by the FSA’s successor, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), since 
2013.  
 
It was in this context that, in 2004, ‘depolarisation’ reforms were introduced.  These 
reforms created an additional third category of adviser firm – one which could ‘multi-
tie’ to a limited number of providers.  It was argued that even if consumers did not shop 
around, using a multi-tied adviser provided greater choice. It also created competition 
amongst product providers to tie with these multi-tie firms.  The reforms also included 
enhanced disclosure of information by product providers so that consumers could 
exercise greater influence in the market by being more aware of the choices available to 
them.   In addition, advisers were required to offer clients the opportunity to pay by fee 
if they wished to be regarded as independent. This last reform was based on evidence 
suggesting consumers regarded ‘independent’ advice as advice that is not influenced by 
the amount of commission an adviser receives from a product provider (FSA, 2002b:18-
20).  The idea was to avoid any suspicion of commission bias in adviser 
recommendations.   
 
Yet, by 2007 the FSA had returned again to the issue of market efficiency, announcing 
that: 
 
there are features associated with the distribution of retail investment 
products that result in inefficiencies for the market and poor outcomes for 
consumers. This is despite intensive regulation in this area for nearly two 






It noted that, despite previous significant reforms, ‘The market for the distribution of 
retail investment products is characterised by a number of market failures’ (FSA, 
2007:15).  These failures centred around three key concerns: complexity of products 
and charges; lack of consumer experience and knowledge; and the potential for the first 
two concerns to lead to consumer detriment as a result of any misalignment of interests 
between advisers and their clients.  It also noted two further issues linked to market 
failures: the cost of advice, leading to poorer access for consumers; and the relatively 
low level of qualification required for financial advisers. It was suggested the latter 
might help explain both poor consumer outcomes and lack of trust in financial advisers. 
 
Thus was the start of the RDR.  By 31st December 2012, when a series of reforms were 
introduced and implemented, the regulator had produced 18 Consultation Papers, 5 
Discussion Papers, 15 Policy Statements and 17 separate pieces of research (FSA, 
2015).    Whilst it is not possible to provide a chronicle of these developments in this 
discussion, it is important to highlight three key elements that formed the basis of the 
reforms.  Firstly, advisers are categorised as providing a service which is either 
‘independent’, taken to mean unbiased, unrestricted advice based on a comprehensive 
and fair analysis of the relevant market; or restricted, being any advice which is not 
independent.  The aim is to provide greater clarity for consumers.  Firms are required to 
disclose in writing to each client which service they will provide (FSA, 2009a). 
 
Secondly, payment by commission is banned and adviser firms can only be remunerated 
by ‘adviser charges’, agreed with the client at the start of the advice process. The aim is 
‘to reduce the potential for remuneration to influence adviser recommendations, directly 
or indirectly’ (FSA, 2009a:23). Thirdly, to ‘deliver standards of professionalism that 
inspire consumer confidence and build trust’ (FSA, 2009a:40) advisers must attain a 
higher level of basic qualification than previously required, complete mandatory annual 
CPD requirements, and sign up to a Code of Ethics as part of membership of a 
recognised professional body. 
 
In addition, the FSA set out its thinking on ‘simplified advice’ – more streamlined 





cheaper) manner in limited and less complex advisory situations.  Although the same 
requirements regarding charging, disclosure of status and professionalism must apply, 
the aim is to try and overcome ‘gaps’ that might arise as a result of the costs of ‘full’ 
RDR-compliant financial advice excluding some consumers who may be unable or 
unwilling to pay the charges for independent or restricted advice (Clare, 2013). 
 
In summary, the history of recent reforms in the UK retail advice sector, spurred on by 
the RDR, has been one of attempts to address lack of competition in the market (for 
example, addressing ‘vertical restraints’ through multi-tie advisers); to address what are 
considered to be information asymmetries arising from the complexity of financial 
products and charges (for example, through greater, and simpler, disclosure of 
information about both the advice service provided and products recommended); and to 
address externalities, such as lack of trust caused by financial scandals (for example, by 
addressing issues of potential bias and professionalism).   
 
Performativity and agencement in the reform of retail advice 
 
Foucault argued that in order to understand agency what is required is not a theory of 
the subject, but a theory of discursive practice (Foucault, 1970).  Networks of 
knowledges, controls and resistances are linked in a discursive practice of disciplinary 
regimes, and particularly through repeated performances of ‘technologies of the self’ 
(Dean, 1996; Redman, 2000:10).  An adequate conception of agency and the agent only 
comes through examining the performance of these discursive practices. 
 
The notion of discursive development of identity is also taken up by Butler, who uses 
performativity as a means of understanding how the ‘self’ is constituted.  For Butler, 
commonly held discourses concerning ‘gender’ can be created, sustained or undermined 
through performance.  In this sense, performance can enable agency – performativity is 
not an act of description, but constitution of the self through an act of description.  At 
the same time, continuous acts of performance take place within a pre-existing (self-) 
‘regulatory’ frame.  To understand the performative nature of these acts, it is important 





all of this comes to be incorporated into individual subject positions.  This also draws 
attention to the relevance of context – that the possibilities of performativity, of agency, 
are dependent upon the network of connections, relations and resources that can be 
drawn upon and integrated into the act of performance (Butler, 1993).  The importance 
of connections is also emphasised by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) who draw attention 
to the importance of the piecing together (they use the term agencent), or assembling, of 
elements to understand the importance of multiplicity in the origins of behaviour and 
ideas.   
 
The notion of ‘assemblages’ is taken up by Callon, who uses this as a means of drawing 
attention to the manner in which interconnected elements have a capacity both to act 
(agency) and give meaning to that agency.  A significant aspect of the work of Callon, 
therefore, is in drawing our attention to market devices, agencements, connected 
through material and discursive practice (Callon et al., 2006).  Importantly for the 
present discussion, these assemblages are performative, being the collection of human, 
technical, material and social elements from which performance springs, and in turn 
from which ‘markets’ and market actors are constructed and understood.  (Muniesa et 
al. 2006).  In turn, this obliges us to not take markets and market behaviour for granted 
as some form of natural phenomena, nor the theories underpinning them as simply the 
description of such phenomena.  Rather, it is necessary to explore the manner in which 
market architectures, and the rights and obligations within those architectures, are 
constructed. 
 
In the present context, characterising the issues facing retail financial services in terms 
of market efficiency comes from the epistemic domain of economics.  Neoclassical 
economics claims a perfectly competitive market allocates resources optimally, relying 
upon the rationality of the market participants, the availability of the appropriate 
information, and the laws of supply and demand.  This latter element assumes voluntary 
exchange between market participants, with full information, creating maximum benefit 
for both buyers and sellers. To the extent that problems exist in securing this normative 
‘ideal’ state, it is argued that any ‘failures’ in a market can be addressed.  This may 





availability of market information, or addressing issues that might otherwise ‘block’ the 
natural supply of, or demand for, a product. 
 
For Callon, such a theory becomes performative ‘if it contributes to the construction of 
the reality that it describes’ (2006, p.7).  It must be able to systematically incorporate 
the phenomena, events, the data over which it claims to have epistemic authority, such 
that what results is the state referenced by the theory (see Preda, 2007).  Callon 
identifies the importance of understanding the ‘relationships between statements and 
their worlds as socio-technical agencements…….. the idea of a combination of 
heterogeneous elements that have been carefully adjusted to one another’ (Callon, 2006, 
p.13). This assemblage of elements interacts to create the conditions enunciated by 
theoretical statements.  It is in this context that we might refer to RDR as a socio-
technical agencement. 
 
Here, as well as theory itself, we need to take account of technology, systems and tools 
– ‘market devices’ (Callon et al., 2006) – as elements of an agencement.  Thus, 
addressing market failure in the UK advice sector is increasingly associated with 
developments in internet solutions, mobile ‘apps’, planning tools, and interactive 
financial models to ‘transform’ individuals into putative ‘life planners’ (Fowler, 2011).  
At the same time, adviser and provider use of electronic ‘platforms’, creating an ever-
widening choice of investments and the tools to manage them, have become 
commonplace (Clare et al., 2013).  These are incorporated into the advice process as a 
means of overcoming market failures such as ‘information asymmetries’ created by the 
‘principal/agent’ problem.  
 
Performation in action 
 
It is submitted that such developments illustrate Mackenzie’s notion of ‘generic’ 
performativity; where ‘an aspect of economics ……is used, not just by academic 
economists, but in the ‘real world’’ (MacKenzie, 2006: 16-18).  In that context, the 
provision of retail financial advice in the UK is understood as a ‘market’, suffering 





broadly speaking, a commonplace notion within the financial services industry, amongst 
commentators and market participants. It is also a fundamental assertion of the UK 
regulator.  
 
We can also witness ‘effective’ performativity; that is, ‘a process involving use of the 
aspect of economics in question differs in some significant way ….. from what would 
take place if economics was not used.’ (MacKenzie, 2006:18).  MacKenzie (2006) 
points out that the difficulty of not being able to carry out a ‘with’/’without’ comparison 
means this issue is often one of judgement or conjecture.  That said, it is possible to 
distinguish several strands of development in the UK advice sector which are neither 
inevitable nor obvious in their trajectory or outcome, and which suggest it is possible to 
delineate evidence of effective performativity. 
 
The idea of information asymmetries, market failures arising from consumers lacking 
information or understanding products or processes, suggests it is possible to make 
individuals more ‘effective’ consumers by providing them with more information, better 
and more widespread financial education (Personal Financial Education Group, 2013a 
and 2013b) or making processes simpler (Sandler, 2001).  This goes further than 
providing a better service to consumers to gain custom, or taking advantage of new 
technology to improve the provision of services and products.  Individuals must be 
provided with specific information in very specific formats and at specific times (see 
FCA Conduct of Business Sourcebook (2015)). Even absent such requirements, 
advisers are provided with suggestions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ practice in providing 
information and support (FCA, 2013a).  Financial education is now integrated into 
school curricula, and significant efforts are being devoted to ‘guiding’ financial 
consumers (Personal Finance Education Group, 2013b; the Money Advice Service, 
2011). As well as providing evidence of the incorporation of economic market theory 
into the infrastructure of financial advice (MacKenzie, 2006), it might be argued that 
what we see here is the development, more or less tentatively (see FSA, 2008b), of the 






RDR’s incorporation of the need to address market failures and externalities, and thus 
increase competition, has resulted in a significant ‘remodelling’ of retail financial 
consumers as well as the financial advice ‘market’.  The abolition of commission, 
categorisation of advisers as either ‘independent’ or restricted’, and requirements 
concerning higher qualifications and ongoing professionalism, have not been 
inevitabilities, as witnessed by debates throughout the reform process.  They have, 
nevertheless, brought significant changes to the advice models and practices of financial 
firms and advisers, as well as to products, advice and charging models and general 
practices of both advisers and providers of financial services (Clare et al., 2013; Fowler, 
2011; Fundscape, 2014).   
 
Reforms concerning professionalism, again underpinned by the need to address market 
failures, have enhanced the role and reach of professional bodies in developing an 
appropriate qualifications framework, as well as the monitoring of standards and ethics 
(FSA, 2009b).  This was not the only route available to the regulator (FSA, 2009b and 
2010), but it is one that has been grasped with both hands by professional bodies (see, 
for example, CII, 2011 and CISI, 2012). Having established themselves as ethical 
guardians, this has had very specific implications for the behaviours and businesses of 
those who must now publicly commit themselves to professional body codes of conduct 
and ethics.  Again this suggests effective performativity – that the process and outcomes 
have differed from what might have taken place if the underpinning rationale of market 
efficiency had not been present. 
 
What makes performation possible is the socio-technical agencement which ‘ties 
together all these scattered elements into a chain in which they are all indissociably 
linked.  One is forced to go through them just as if a line of reasoning was being 
unfolded, a system developed or a law applied.’ (Callon & Latour, 1981:289).  It is in 
this spatio-temporal frame that the notions of market efficiency and failure ‘function’, 
that performation takes place (Callon, 2006). The theory of market efficiency is not a 
mirror reflecting some knowable configuration, offering the opportunity to perform a 
slight adjustment in the mirror’s gaze.  The agencement ‘performed’ in the RDR is the 





insinuates itself into the language used to constitute that ‘market’.  ‘Market failures’ are 
addressed in a way that results in less ‘imperfect’ information, fewer ‘externalities’, and 
reductions in ‘imbalances’ of power or ‘barriers’ to entry.  Consumers are ‘empowered’ 
to address the ‘principal/agent’ problem.  The delivery of advice is altered to reduce 
‘restraints’ and ‘biases’.  The resulting claims of greater ‘efficiency’ draw upon the 
positive connotations of ‘efficiency’ to assert legitimation for the very reforms they laud 
(Mackenzie, 2006; Henriksen, 2013). 
 
Judging the success of the reforms in the retail advice market therefore becomes an 
assessment of the extent to which performation takes place through the sociotechnical 
agencement of the RDR.  It is an evaluation of the extent to which an ‘efficient market’ 
in financial services is constituted through acts understood as ‘performances’ of the 
theory of market efficiency.    
 
A retail advice sector in performance – the difficulties for 
RDR  
 
If ‘the success or failure of the performation ……. is the realization of the socio-
technical agencement inscribed in the statement’ (2006, p.18), then it is not obvious that 
the RDR has acted to create an advice sector where consumers and advisers function as 
efficient market participants.  Rather, examining the landscape of the retail advice sector 
reforms reveals what Mackenzie (2007) calls ‘counterperformativity’. That is, the 
deployment of the theory of market efficiency may, in some respects, have made things 
less ‘efficient’.  This may be as a result of what Callon refers to as ‘overflowing’, where 
‘the fact of imposing devices designed to realize a statement causes other worlds to 
proliferate in reaction to that performation’ (2006, pp.17-18).  He argues:  
 
The history of science is nothing but the long and interminable series of 
untimely overflowings, of socio-technical agencements that have been 







In the case of the RDR, several examples of its unintended, or unanticipated, 
consequences illustrate this argument. 
 
Confusion: advisers and advice 
 
The past decade has brought three different definitions of ‘independent’ advice, two 
different definitions of ‘tied’ advice (subsequently scrapped as a category of advice 
altogether), and the introduction of ‘multi-tied’ advice - then removed and replaced by 
the notion of ‘restricted’ advice. Consumers were confused and misled under the 
depolarised regime (Bamford, 2006; FSA, 2006), and under recent reforms the scope for 
confusion and lack of transparency has actually increased (Fowler, 2011; FCA 2013b).  
The notion of financial advice, even restricting oneself to terminology used by the 
regulator, now includes ‘regulated’ advice, ‘independent’ advice, ‘restricted advice’, 
‘focused’ advice, ‘simplified’ advice, ‘basic’ advice and ‘generic’ advice (Hurman & 
Costain, 2012; FCA, 2014a).  In some cases, descriptions of advice appear to be being 
used in a misleading way (Reichman, 2014); and even industry participants have sought 
further clarification on what the definitions mean in practice (FCA, 2014a).   
 
At the same time, Government policy has seen the promotion of ‘guidance’, regarded as 
something that falls short of regulated advice (FCA, 2014a). This has created debate and 
confusion about the distinction between guidance and advice (Hamilton, 2014).  It is 
compounded by the main provider of guidance in the UK refers to this as its ‘own free 
and impartial advice service5’ (the Money Advice Service, 2014) and the two main 
providers delivering a Government guarantee of pension guidance being The Pensions 
Advisory Service and the Citizens Advice Bureau (Cumbo, 2014).  
 
The result is that attempts to provide clarity and reduce information asymmetries and 
adviser bias have resulted in greater confusion.  At the same time, the capability of the 
RDR, with its rationale of market efficiency, to meet the range of needs and desires 
evident in those seeking security through investment in financial products, has been 






The advice gap and the DIY investor  
 
The RDR reforms are creating an advice ‘gap’ as a result of millions of individuals 
either being unwilling to pay for advice, or not having sufficient investable assets to be 
profitable for advisers  (Clare, 2013; Fowler, 2011; Hurman & Costain, 2012).  Despite 
attempts to encourage more cost-effective models for ‘simpler’ advice situations, the 
application of ‘full advice’ standards to such ‘simplified’ models is problematic for 
advisers (FCA, 2014a).  There is a reluctance to engage in simpler, automated processes 
which might enable advice to be delivered more cheaply to a wider range of clients, but 
which advisers fear could be judged by the advice standards applied to individual 
consultations with a qualified financial adviser (FCA, 2014b). 
 
Partly as a consequence of these developments, there is a growing prevalence of ‘DIY’ 
investors (Deloitte, 2012; Fundscape, 2014).  Using a range of, often interactive, media 
and applications, and taking advantage of the latest technology in web-based platforms 
(Fundscape, 2014), some firms have exploited the advice ‘gap’ to attract and manage 
investment funds by enabling financial decisions to be made by individual consumers 
using support and guidance (but not ‘advice’) provided by those firms. This brings with 
it the danger of ‘guidance’ (as opposed to advice for which a firm or adviser takes 
responsibility) motivating individuals to make partially informed or understood 
decisions (Fowler, 2011; NMG Consulting, 2014).  Whilst the proliferation of software 
and interactive media has made it easier for individuals to arrive at ‘guided’ decisions 
themselves, there is evidence to suggest some may perceive this assistance as advice, 
and that a significant minority still end up making decisions harmful to their financial 
security (Hurman & Costain, 2012; NMG Consulting, 2014). 
 
Again, we find what can be regarded as ‘overflowing’ (Callon, 2006).  The actions and 
outcomes emerging from the RDR have created dubiety over what may be understood 
as ‘advice’ in the retail investment market, both amongst advisers and consumers.  At 
the same time, confusion over the status of ‘guidance’ creates opportunities for 
misunderstandings and potential problems.   Indeed, the advice ‘gap’, and increasing 





notion of a market adequately articulates the experience of individual financial services 
consumers.  Characterising this as a domain where market failures have been addressed 
and consumers can, or can be enabled to, overcome the remaining information 
asymmetries or other inefficiencies in retail financial services markets, becomes more 
difficult to maintain.    
 
Capability of consumers  
 
This last point highlights a further concern over the ability of individuals asked to make, 
sometimes complex, investment decisions.  The wealthy are likely to be more 
financially capable (Atkinson et al., 2006; Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, 2013) as well as being more able to afford financial advice. By contrast, the 
complicated nature of financial services, alongside lack of financial capability, are key 
issues for the less well off (FSA,  2003; Atkinson et al., 2006).  In part, this is due to 
relatively low levels of literacy and numeracy (Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, 2013; OECD, 2013).  With general numeracy declining in recent years, around 
80per cent of adults in the UK have low levels of numeracy (National Numeracy, 2014).  
Indeed, one national survey found that 16per cent of those surveyed could not identify 
the balance on a bank statement (the Money Advice Service, 2013).  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that individuals generally express low levels of confidence 
in their financial abilities (Clery et al., 2007 and 2010) and that evidence suggests that 
retail investors experience significant levels of confusion and uncertainty (Webb et al., 
2014).  It might be argued that financial skills can improve with experience, and that the 
issue is as much about engagement as it is about capability (Selnow, 2004). However, 
recent research suggests those currently ‘not engaged’ with the financial services 
industry, that is non-investors, comprise over 50per cent of the adult population. For 
individuals with investment and savings products, the same research also suggests that 
only around one fifth have a good understanding of the products they hold (Clare, 






In the case of pensions saving, the UK government has responded by introducing 
automatic enrolment – a process whereby employers automatically enrol employees into 
pension schemes and deduct contributions from their wages (although employees have 
the right to opt out). This attempts to overcome lack of financial knowledge or 
engagement by exploiting predictable consumer heuristics, in this case inertia, as a 
means of altering financial behaviour (see, for example, Dixon, 2006; Elliott et al., 
2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  It is argued that inertia (lack of engagement) will 
result in employees remaining in the pension scheme and, through its default 
mechanism, continuing to make private retirement provision.  
 
Yet, this calls into question any approach based on market failure, and attempts to 
‘remedy’ lack of financial awareness or ability when millions are now being enlisted  as 
pension investors and becoming financial ‘consumers’ without the need to be engaged 
in, or understand, the investment market at all.  
 
RDR and its difficulties – a case of counterperformation 
 
It is submitted that the effectiveness of the RDR as an agencement lies in the ability of 
the theory of market efficiency to be performative; firstly, to ‘disentangle’ the socio-
economic complexity of the lives of individuals, as well as the multi-faceted nature and 
role of a financial services industry in a modern society; and secondly, to assemble 
various elements from within that complexity to produce action and outcomes that 
resolve the complexity through addressing market failures and increasing market 
efficiency (see Callon, 2006).   In this way, fundamental and overlapping questions 
concerning individual financial security, the role and responsibilities of the financial 
services industry in the lives of individuals, the inherent risks in financial transactions, 
and the role of the state in ensuring social protection (in particular pensions and health), 
are understood and addressed through a very specific prism.   
 
This requires very particular forms of action and outcomes. It requires ethical and 
professionalised advisers whose role is now to assist financial consumers in achieving 





as well as products and their charging structures, to become clear and transparent for 
those seeking advice (FCA, 2013a).  It also involves ‘empowered’ individuals acting on 
the basis of appropriate guidance, information and education.  This reduces information 
asymmetries and makes those individuals capable of shouldering the responsibilities 
they have as financial consumers to seek out (and understand) information and to take 
and understand advice, as appropriate, to ensure their own financial security in 
retirement.  As Callon puts it: 
 
 performative programs of economics ……. tend to localize agencies in 
(individual) human corporeal envelopes and to equip them with tools, 
instruments, prostheses  …. and rights, enabling them to construct 
something like individual interests (likened to income, indexes of 
satisfaction or welfare, or degrees of recognition of their legitimate 
dignity), and granting them the resources to calculate them. (Callon, 2006, 
p.45) 
 
Individuals seeking financial well-being can be assisted, where necessary, to become 
calculating investors (Ring, 2010), equipped with an increasing  range of ‘enabling’ 
technical tools, information sources and prompts to assist them in fulfilling this role.  
Well-being is now capable of being delivered through an increasingly commodified and 
transparent advice process.  Advice, guidance and ‘simplified’ advice can be defined, 
packaged and delivered to suitably empowered consumers.   It is the ‘agency’ of RDR, 
the assemblage of tools, systems, processes, texts, actors  and equipment, that ‘acts’ to 
bring this about. 
 
Yet, as we have seen, there is dubiety about what constitutes advice; about the dividing 
line between advice and guidance, as well as the difference between independent and 
restricted advice.  This is already leading to confusion and potential detriment.  In 
addition, the ability of individuals to access professional financial advice has 
diminished, and there remains doubt about the potential availability of less intensive 
‘simplified’ advice.  Many are still confused by financial products, despite efforts to 
promote financial education and awareness. As a result, many more individuals have 
become ‘DIY’ investors in the absence of viable alternatives and in the face of (for 






The agencement of RDR, in producing actions and outcomes that appear to undermine 
the RDR itself, exhibits counterperformativity.  It is an example of ‘socio-technical 
agencements that have been caught out, unable to discipline and frame the entities that 
they assemble’ (Callon, 2006:18).   
 
Conclusion    
 
The introduction of the RDR is the latest in a line of reforms addressing what are 
considered to be market failures in the retail financial services.  It represents a 
significant set of reforms, and as a result its potential to deliver successful outcomes has 
been the subject of much discussion.   
 
While it might be considered as very early to make definitive judgements, it can be 
argued that what is clear is that the RDR has resulted in an ‘advice gap’.  At the same 
time, the structure of the reforms makes it difficult to deliver the kind of ‘simplified 
advice’ which many believe is necessary to address the gap.  This has already resulted 
in further consultation and dialogue from the regulator as it attempts to adjust, or at least 
clarify, the nature of the reforms in order to deliver the consumer outcomes intended 
(FCA, 2014a). 
 
Yet, the analysis in this article suggests that the problems are more deep-seated.  Based 
particularly upon the work of Callon concerning performativity and agencement, it has 
been argued that the RDR has been undermined by a fundamental difficulty arising 
from its own basic logic. Specifically, there are problems with the notion that retail 
financial services should be understood in terms of a ‘market’ that can be made to work 
‘efficiently’ to produce optimal welfare outcomes for individual savers, and that the 
nature and conduct of advisers and individuals can be shaped to enable this to happen.  
Here, we return to Callon’s observation that: 
 
The history of science is nothing but the long and interminable series of 
untimely overflowings, of socio-technical agencements that have been 
caught out, unable to discipline and frame the entities that they assemble. 






The regulator’s attempt to create an ‘efficient market’ in retail financial services can be 
likened to an attempt to push air out of a partially inflated balloon.  As one set of 
problems are pressed down on, another set of problems pop up elsewhere.  On each 
occasion, as the notion of market efficiency works within an assemblage of individuals, 
institutions, tools, processes, devices and procedures to constitute its own ‘reality’, 
further problems or ‘inefficiencies’ arise.  This should not be surprising.  As a simple 
starting point, there are broader issues, including psychological and ontological security, 
and collective and individual social needs and biographies, which we would need to 
incorporate into any comprehensive analysis or understanding of the relationship of 
individuals and financial institutions in a modern economy.  As has been suggested by 
Sandel, not all human behaviour can be understood as market behaviour; nor can social 
relations be re-made in the image of market relations (Sandel, 2012). 
 
Observing the problems and shortcomings of an economic approach to the regulation of 
financial services is not new (see Georgosouli, 2007).  However, the significance of this 
discussion is in drawing attention to the processes by which action and outcomes in the 
sphere of financial advice have arisen. The notion of agencement enables a tracing of 
the actions and outcomes in recent reform of the UK’s retail advice sector, suggesting 
that the experience has been one of performation and counterperformation.  This 
analysis of the RDR suggests that, in the context of UK retail financial advice, we 
should brace ourselves for further unintended consequences and further reforms.       
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